Fictional Mechanical Minds
On the Relationship Between Assumptions of Rationality and Conceptions of Government
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.60923/issn.2724-6299/22550Keywords:
rationality, political legitimacy, decision-making process, aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy, machine-governmentAbstract
If a machine were considered more rational than any other agent, would we entrust it with the government of public affairs? This paper aims to examine the relationship between rationality and political justification. The thesis whose soundness I will verify is: (T1) Depending on which subject’s (greater) rationality is assumed, different conceptions of government emerge. The link between assumptions of rationality and political legitimacy implies another thesis: (T) Under certain conditions, to legitimize a subject to decide on matters of collective interest, it is necessary to assume that the deciding subject is rational. Firstly, the terms of the issue must be clarified: (1) the subjects who confer legitimacy on a government; (2) the assumptions of rationality; (3) rationality; (4) the decision-making subjects; (5) machines as decision-making subjects; (6) the conceptions of government. Secondly, under what conditions do the assumptions of rationality become essential to legitimize a government’s decision on matters of public interest? Finally, starting from three distinct political subjects – (A) the individuals, (B) the individuals conceived as a collective, and (C) the machine – it will be shown how, by assuming their rationality, three distinct conceptions of government take shape that are: (A1) aggregative democracy; (B1) de-liberative democracy; (C1) machine-government.
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